The issue of free will is intimately linked to that of consciousness. Our intuitive view is that we have conscious free will – we make conscious choices and then act to implement those choices in the physical world. This is the basis of our common sense understanding of our existence and also of our moral and ethical systems. However the belief in free will has been under attack in recent decades.
Some theories of consciousness – especially those of a physicalist nature – see consciousness as
an epiphenomenon. This is an impotent form of consciousness underwhich free will is simply an illusion, with all the moral implications that result.
What Is Free Will?
There are many possible definitions of free will. For me, there are two factors: the ability to choose and the ability to act. Free will requires both.
Ability To Choose
To have free will we must have the ability to choose between possible actions. Defining what we mean by choice is difficult: it must be neither strictly caused nor purely random.
Note the words “strictly” and “purely” in that last sentence. A choice can be influenced by fixed or probabilistic factors (physical or mental) in the sense that they inform that choice. However these factors must not dictate the result of that choice.
Current science does not appear able to provide a mechanism to explain such choice.
Ability To Act
To have free will it is not enough to have freedom to choose. We must also be able to translate those choices into actions that determine the course of the physical universe, even if only at the most trivial level.
In other words free will requires a causal interaction between consciousness and the physical world. Current science does not appear able to provide a mechanism to explain such interaction.
Free Will and Determinism
Is free will possible in a causally deterministic world? My position is that it is not: determinism removes freedom to choose.
In a deterministic universe, any choice we think we make is pre-determined, either at an absolute or statistical level. Andy might think he is choosing to buy a chicken rather than a cheese sandwich but in fact that is the unavoidable result of the history of the universe. Untold billions of years of physics have led to the moment where his hand reaches out and picks up the chicken rather than the cheese.
Under a purely physicalist interpretation of consciousness, this action is predetermined by the neurons in Andy’s brain firing in accordance with the standard model of physics. Some theories allow for a more dualistic theory of consciousness but also accept determinism. In these cases the causality involves previous conscious experiences but the conclusion (chicken) is still unavoidable.
Quantum theory suggests a possible way out from this problem by introducing a probabilistic model. It’s not certain that Andy will choose chicken, just highly likely. However uncertainty is not the same as freedom. If the choice is made by the universe rolling dice then we do not have a free choice. To allow for freedom we have to introduce some aspect of consciousness that interacts with and influences the quantum decision making. This is an idea that is not accepted in physicalist epiphenomenal views of consciousness. It also sounds sufficiently dualistic to be unacceptable in principle to many people. So for those espousing epiphenomenal and/or non-dualistic views of consciousness, quantum mechanics provides no escape from the conclusion that free will is incompatible with determinism.
There is an argument that all human actions are either caused or random, hence there can be no free will. I disagree with the premise and would add “willed” as a third category of action.
Willed actions (agent causation) might or might not be a subset of “caused actions” depending on the nature of consciousness.
Some people have argued that it is still possible to have freedom and moral responsibility in a deterministic universe. This compatibilist approach is one I find deeply unconvincing.
Free Will and Epiphenomenalism
Many theories of consciousness, especially those associated with physicalism, consider consciousness to be an
epiphenomenon. In these theories, consciousness is an impotent by-product of the physical world, an observer that cannot affect the course of events. Any intuitive belief we have that we can actually turn will into action is an illusion.
Under these theories there can be no free will because even if we freely choose an action there is no way we can make it happen. By definition, epiphenomenal consciousness is “one way”: from the physical world to the mental. The mental (our choice, if such exists) cannot affect the physical.
We can go further and say that impotent consciousness also denies freedom to choose. Since epiphenomenal consciousness is simply a by-product of the physical world then any “choices” we appear to make are also by-products of the physical world. Choice is hence an illusion under an epiphenomenal system of consciousness.
Libet
Many opponents of free will like to quote the Libet experiments of the 1980’s as evidence that free will doesn’t exist and is simply an illusion.
Despite what some have claimed, Libet’s experiments do not mean “the death of free will”. There are other possible interpretations of his results. Libet’s own paper (Libet et al 1983) concludes:
“However, accepting our conclusion that spontaneous voluntary acts
can be initiated unconsciously, there would remain at least two types of conditions
in which conscious control could be operative. (1) There could be a conscious ‘veto’
that aborts the performance even of the type of ‘spontaneous’ self-initiated act
under study here. This remains possible because reportable conscious intention,
even though it appeared distinctly later than onset of RP, did appear a substantial
time (about 150 to 200 ms) before the beginning of the movement as signalled by the
EMG. Even in our present experiments, subjects have reported that some recallable
conscious urges to act were ‘aborted’ or inhibited before any actual movement
occurred; in such cases the subject simply waited for another urge to appear which,
when consummated, constituted the actual event whose RP was recorded (Libet et
al, 1982). (2) In those voluntary actions that are not ‘spontaneous’ and quickly
performed, that is, in those in which conscious deliberation (of whether to act or of
what alternative choice of action to take) precedes the act, the possibilities for
conscious initiation and control would not be excluded by the present evidence.”
Libet et al 1983
Libet expanded further on the conscious veto (often described as a free won’t) in Libet 1999. Although this restricted form of free will is
not very appealing it is still strong enough to pass the tests of choice and the ability to act.
My Position
My position is that we do have free will, both in terms of ability to choose and ability to act. I believe this to be at a stronger level than “free won’t”. This belief is based on a
combination of intuition and observation. It has significant consequences for my position on
the nature of the universe in general and consciousness in particular:
- Since determinism is contrary to free will my belief in free will means that I must reject determinism.
- Since epiphenomenalism is contrary to free will my belief in free will means that I must reject an epiphenomenal interpretation of consciousness.
- Since reductionist physicalist theories of consciousness result in consciousness being an impotent epiphenomenon my belief in free will means that I must reject such theories.
References:
Libet, Benjamin et al. 1983. Time of Consciousness Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential). Brain vol 106
Libet, Benjamin. 1999. Do We have Free Will?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No 8-9