Mysterianism is the position that we cannot solve the problems of consciousness. One of the leading proponents of this idea is Colin McGinn.
According to mysterianism the very nature of consciousness places it beyond our theoretical understanding. This is not to say that no explanation exists or that such an explanation is some form of spooky dualism. A simple, scientific explanation of consciousness as a natural phenomenon may well exist. We simply lack the faculties to grasp it.
Mysterianism is sometimes called new mysterianism to distinguish it from the supernatural dualist position (“old mysterianism”). The term was coined by Owen Flanagan who describes it thus:
“[New mysterianism] is the view that naturalism is true. There are in fact properties of the brain that account naturalistically for consciousness. But we cannot grasp these properties or explain how consciousness depends on them. Consciousness is terminally mysterious to our minds but possibly not to the minds of greater intelligence. It is terminally mysterious not because it is a nonnatural phenomenon, not because it is miracles, but because an understanding of its nature is “cognitively closed” to us. The problem of consciousness is a case where we know how to ask the question but lack the mental powers to find the answer.”
(Flanagan 1992)
My only quibble with this definition would be to replace “greater intelligence” with “differing intelligence”.
McGinn 1999 provides a comprehensive argument for the mysterian viewpoint. It’s one I reluctantly find very believable.
McGinn notes that we have two methods for examining the universe: perception and introspection. Perception allows us to know what is happening in the outside world, introspection allows us to know what is going on inside our heads. Unfortunately consciousness occurs on the border between the inner and outer worlds, so neither perception nor introspection is capable of really grasping its nature.
This is a depressing view that I find counter-intuitive. Maybe I am being intellectually arrogant on behalf of the human race, but I like to think that we should be able to at least form a theoretical model of anything even if we can’t properly observe it. When it comes to consciousness we may well be stuck in Plato’s cave, but we should at least be able to deduce something from the shadows.
I like to think we should at least be able to create mathematical models of consciousness as we do for quantum mechanics. However McGinn cautions:
“Maybe, for all I know, it will prove possible to devise some sort of purely formal or mathematical model of space that can accommodate consciousness. But this will not translate into any intuitive conception of what is being modelled.”
(McGinn 1999)
Perhaps not, but it would be better than nothing.
Language
Another argument in favour of mysterianism can be made from human language. According to the universal grammar hypothesis, human brains are “hard wired” to understand a certain type of language and grammar.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (linguistic relativity) suggests that the nature of our language constrains the nature of our thought. This is intuitively obvious and was famously the idea behind NewSpeak in George Orwell’s novel “1984”. There is significant support for at least a weak version of Sapir-Worf being correct.
If both universal grammar and Sapir-Worf are correct then this provides possible support for mysterianism. If we are “hard wired” for a certain sort of language and if language constrains our thinking then it follows that we have hard-wired constraints to our thinking. This would imply that as humans there are some things we are simply incapable of thinking about correctly; perhaps consciousness is one of them.
References:
Flanagan, Owen. Consciousness Reconsidered. MIT Press 1992
McGinn, Colin. The Mysterious Flame. Basic Books 1999