Free Will Experiment
01-Aug-2013: Original version

Many theories of consciousness reject the existence of free will. This is especially true of theories that treat consciousness as an epiphenomenon, which is impotent by definition.

Such a rejection of free will runs counter to our everyday observations and has serious moral implications. As such it should only be adopted cautiously when there is significant evidence to support it. Those who reject free will often quote the Libet experiments.

As a believer in free will I have performed a simple experiment that I believe is as least as conclusive in supporting free will as Libet is in rejecting it.

The Experiment

If free will is an epiphenomenal illusion and cannot affect our actions then it follows that suppressing free will can also have no choice on our actions.

For this experiment I compared the actions of the subject when free will was suppressed to the subject's normal behaviour. Specifically, I sat in a chair for fifteen minutes and made no conscious attempt to initiate any action.

During the period of the experiment the subject's autonomous functions continued normally as expected. In addition there were elements of behaviour that might be described as "fidgeting": crossing legs, shifting position, etc.

However at no point during the experiment did the subject exhibit behaviour consistent with normal routine. For example, at no point during the experiment did the subject pick up a book and begin to read or walk out to the kitchen to make a cup of tea.

Behaviour of the subject with free will repressed but all other degrees of freedom intact was thus severely at odds with behaviour when free will was allowed to manifest itself. This experiment has been repeated with the same results.

I thus conclude that suppressing free will alters behaviour in the physical world. This implies that free will is not an impotent epiphenomenon.

Possible Objections

1) Free will was not truly suppressed. Rather than "not choosing" the subject "chose to do nothing".
If this is true then it implies that "choosing not to act" had an effect on the subject's behaviour, therefore the conclusion that free will exists still stands.

2) The time "chosen" to start the experiment was dictated by the fact that physical factors meant no action was planned. Perhaps the subject's body was ready for a rest.
This objection can easily be overcome by arranging for a random alarm during the course of the day to trigger the start of the experiment. I have not yet tested this but am confident that the results would be the same.

3) The nature of the experiment effectively "switched of" any physical action potential.
The subject has frequently been in the same position as during in the experiment and has exhibited significant physical behaviour. The only difference during the experiment is the suppression of free will. Switching off action potential would itself be a physical effect and would again justify the conclusions.

4) The decision to run the experiment was itself physically determined, have any apparent suppression of free will was not in itself a wilful act.
This approach attempts to deny the experiment by looking outside the experiment. It is simply an attempt to cling on to epiphenomenalism in defiance of observed facts. Such "pushing back" of determinism could be applied to any experiment; an appeal to this objection suggests that the objector would be unwilling to accept any experimental evidence that undermines their chosen position.

Further Research

Much further research is possible in this area. In particular it would be valuable to observe the behaviour of a subject when free will is suppressed but strong external stimuli are applied: for example when the subject is watching television or being attended to by a professional sexual services provider.

I would be happy to accept a large research grant to continue these studies.