Free Won't
01-Aug-2013: Original version

The Libet experiments have been described by many people as representing "the death of free will". However there are alternative interpretations and Libet himself did not believe that his experiment ruled out the possibility of free will.

Libet noted that in some cases the readiness potential (RP) in the brain built up but no action occurred. He suggested that the subject had "vetoed" an unconscious desire to act.

The Veto Hypothesis

Libet has suggested that instead of "free will" we have "free won't" - a power of veto over our otherwise deterministic responses. Neural activity, instinct and programmed behaviour "suggest" actions which, in the absence of any conscious intervention, are then performed.

Under this interpretation, free will consists of what we don't do. Since there are always different possible actions available to us, the process of veto is in effect a process of making a choice.

Libet summed up this approach thusly:

"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a voluntary act, but rather to control whether the act takes place. We may view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as ‘bubbling up’ in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and abort, with no act appearing."
(Libet 1999)
Of course, as Libet himself points out, the veto decision might itself be the result of deterministic brain activity:
"If the veto itself were to be initiated and developed unconsciously, the choice to veto would then become an unconscious choice of which we become conscious, rather than a consciously causal event."
(ibid)
For now though the veto hypothesis provides an explanation of the Libet experiment that remains compatible with at least some form of free will.

Implications

The veto hypothesis retains a role for free will. As such it retains moral responsibility of the individual for their choices, even if those choices are negative.

However the veto hypothesis is very unlike our intuitive view of conscious free will. The thought that our only control over our lives is to avoid doing things is a depressing one.

It's also difficult to reconcile immediate veto with longer term planning. Let us say I decide to bet on "red" for the next five spins of the roulette wheel. The veto effect can prevent me from betting on "black" or leaving the table at each spin. However there appears to be no adequate way of explaining the advance decision to "bet on red five times" in terms of veto; an advance decision to veto is not a veto.

Personally I accept that we do have a conscious veto over otherwise deterministic actions, however I do not believe that this is all there is to free will. For me the results of the Libet experiment can be adequately incorporated into the presidential model.

References:
Libet, Benjamin. 1999. Do We have Free Will?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No 8-9